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 The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: 
Lessons from the Steel Dispute 
 
Alan O. Sykes*  
 
 Abstract. The recent WTO dispute between the United States and eight 
complainant nations over protective measures for the steel industry brought widespread 
attention to a little known area of WTO law—the rules governing "safeguard measures," 
the temporary protection of troubled industries against import surges. The use of 
safeguard measures is normatively controversial, although their welfare implications are 
much less clear than their critics sometimes suggest. This paper makes the point that 
WTO rules, as interpreted by recent Appellate Body decisions and applied by the dispute 
panel in the steel case, pose nearly insurmountable hurdles to the legal use of safeguard 
measures by WTO members. Among other things, the current interpretation of the 
"nonattribution" requirement for the use of safeguard measures in the WTO Safeguards 
Agreement obliges members to make a demonstration that is logically impossible as an 
economic matter. Those who believe that safeguard measures are merely wasteful 
protectionism may welcome such impediments to their use, but it is not obvious that the 
trading system will benefit in the long run, and there can be little doubt that one key 
objective of the Uruguay Round negotiators—to revive the use of disciplined, temporary 
safeguard actions—is being frustrated. 
 
 The tariffs imposed by the United States on steel imports in 2002, and the final 
WTO ruling against them in November, 2003, brought enormous attention to a subject 
that had already been a subject of considerable controversy within the WTO system—
“safeguard measures.” The original authority for safeguards is Article XIX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (the GATT “escape clause”), which permits the 
imposition of temporary measures to protect industries that exhibit “serious injury” or the 
threat of such injury due to “increased quantities” of imports. The obligations of Article 
XIX were refined and elaborated during the Uruguay Round in the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards. 
 The texts of Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards raise difficult 
conceptual and interpretive issues. In a recent essay written prior to the panel and 
Appellate Body decisions in the steel dispute, I argued that the WTO Appellate Body has 
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done a poor job of addressing these issues, ruling against every safeguard measure that 
had come before it while failing to articulate any coherent principles for the use of 
safeguard measures.1 Instead of resolving the puzzles created by the treaty text, the 
decisions prior to the steel case simply confounded them, imposing requirements for the 
use of safeguards that are economically and logically incoherent and leaving WTO 
members with little guidance as to what will pass legal muster in the future.2 In this 
essay, I update and revise this analysis to encompass both the panel and Appellate Body 
decisions in the steel dispute. As shall become clear, these recent decisions do little to 
alter my fundamental thesis. If WTO members are to employ safeguard measures in 
future without a near certainty of successful legal challenge to them, either the Appellate 
Body must change course and begin to resolve the conceptual muddle that the treaty text 
and its decisions to date have created, or WTO members must renegotiate the Safeguards 
Agreement.  
 Before proceeding, I reiterate a normative disclaimer developed at length in 
earlier writing on the subject: It is not obvious whether additional legal hurdles to 
safeguard measures are a good thing or a bad thing. Viewed narrowly and ex post, 
safeguard measures are inefficient protectionism, generally discouraging the 
redeployment of resources from declining industries to competitive ones. It is 
exceedingly difficult to defend safeguards as a sensible aid to “adjustment” or as a 
                                                 
1Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of Appellate Body Jurisprudence, 2 World Trade 
Rev. ___ (2003). See also Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess Revisited: A Reply to Professor Jones, 3 
World Trade Rev. ___ (2004). 
2Similar themes are developed in Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, United States -- Safeguard 
Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia: What 
Should be Required of a Safeguard Investigation?, in Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., The WTO 
Case Law of 2001 (American Law Institute Reporters Series, Cambridge Press, 2003); and in Gene M. 
Grossman & Petros C. Mavroidis, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular 
Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, in Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., The WTO 
Case Law of 2002 (American Law Institute Reporters Series, Cambridge Press, forthcoming 2004). 
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mechanism for compensating the “losers” from trade liberalization given the availability 
of superior policy instruments for those purposes, among other reasons. 3  
 But this view is too limited—even from the ex post perspective, one must ask 
what would happen in the absence of safeguards. The experience of the GATT system 
suggests that pressures to protect declining industries may be channeled into alternative 
measures that are even worse. “Gray area” measures such as orderly marketing 
agreements and voluntary restraint agreements, potentially unlimited in scope and 
duration, proliferated toward the end of GATT as safeguards fell into disuse. An effort to 
revive safeguards, and to prohibit gray area measures, was clearly at the heart of the 
Uruguay Round Safeguards Agreement. From this perspective, unwarranted legal 
impediments to safeguard measures risk pushing the trading community back toward the 
greater evil of gray area protectionism. Although the Safeguards Agreement contains 
language prohibiting such measures, its effectiveness in the face of pressures to resurrect 
them is unclear—by their nature, gray area measures share quota rents with affected 
exporters, and may leave no one with an incentive and the standing to complain about 
them. 
 In addition, one must consider the ex ante function of safeguards—their role in 
encouraging trade liberalization. Political leaders who anticipate pressure to aid injured 
industries in the face of import surges may be more willing to make trade concessions 
across the board if they know that they can respond to import surges by temporarily 
revoking concessions. It is an empirical question whether the economic gains from the 
enhanced trade concessions that an effective safeguards mechanism can facilitate ex ante 
will be outweighed by the economic costs of safeguard measures ex post. This 
perspective suggests an additional basis for concern about unwarranted impediments to 
safeguards. 
                                                 
3An extended discussion of the normative economics of safeguard measures may be found in Alan O. 
Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative 
Speculations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1991). 
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 The work of Bagwell and Staiger suggests still another reason why safeguards 
may play a constructive role in the trading system. They develop an economic model in 
which import surges create intense political pressure for nations to cheat on their trade 
commitments. Parties to trade agreements can be better off by allowing each other to 
deviate from their commitments under such circumstances—if, instead, all deviations 
were considered “cheating,” the resulting retaliation and counter-retaliation might cause 
trade agreements to unravel.4  
 Given the competing considerations, I take no position on the ultimate normative 
question whether safeguard measures are on balance useful or unproductive. My goal is 
merely to survey the confusing legal landscape that has arisen, and to crystallize the 
issues that must be resolved if safeguards are to offer a viable (i.e., WTO legal) option for 
WTO members to address import surges.  
 Section I will lay out the key provisions of WTO law on safeguards along with 
their history, and note the most important interpretive issues. Section II will then discuss 
and critique the key Appellate Body decisions prior to the steel case.  Section III 
concludes with a look at the steel decisions, emphasizing some interesting and important 
lessons from the panel decision. The Appellate Body decision, by contrast, adds little to 
the analysis of the panel and adds nothing to the unsatisfactory, earlier Appellate Body 
decisions.  
I. The WTO Safeguards Provisions: Legal, Historical and Economic Background 
 GATT Article XIX (1) provides: 
 
“If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the 
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, 
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the 
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under 
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the 
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Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System 104-06 (MIT Press 
2002). 
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contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent 
and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to 
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the 
concession.” 
 An important set of interpretive problems arises under the first clause of Article 
XIX. It provides that safeguard measures are permissible only following “unforeseen 
developments” associated with “the obligations incurred by a contracting party.” What 
constitutes an “unforeseen development”? Unforeseen by whom, at what point in time? 
How does one determine the “effect of the obligations incurred?” These questions had a 
natural answer at the outset of the GATT system, but with time they became quite 
problematic. 
A. The Rise and Fall of “Unforeseen Developments” as a Legal Predicate 
 The original GATT negotiations concluded in 1947, with the expectation that 
GATT would be supplanted within a few years by a new institution to be called the 
International Trade Organization. Political support for that organization waned, however, 
and GATT became the governing instrument for international trade over the long term by 
default. It remained in force until the creation of the WTO in 1995.5 
 The first clause of Article XIX has a natural interpretation in the context of a 
trade agreement that was expected to be short-lived. The negotiators had made a number 
of trade concessions to each other in 1947, and Article XIX provided for their suspension 
in the event that those concessions had an unforeseen, adverse impact on import-
competing industries due to a surge in import competition. To the questions posed above, 
therefore, one might answer that an “unforeseen development” was some development 
that caused the increase in imports following a trade concession under the original GATT 
to be greater than reasonably expected. It had to be unforeseen by the GATT negotiators, 
at the time of the 1947 negotiations. And the import surge had to result from one of the 
                                                 
5See John H, Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan O. Sykes, International Economic Relations 4th ed. at 
211-16 (Minneapolis: West Group 2002)[hereafter Jackson, Davey & Sykes]. 
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original GATT trade concessions, in the sense that it would not have happened but for 
some such concession. 
 But how does one interpret the requirements of Article XIX (1), first clause, in an 
agreement that is still in force after many years? Consider an import surge thirty or forty 
years after the agreement was drafted. What would it mean to say that such a surge 
resulted from the “obligations incurred,” particularly if those obligations were incurred 
decades earlier? Could any such surge have been “foreseen” given the passage of so 
much time? By whom and when? And how are the answers affected by the fact that 
GATT negotiations are ongoing, with new negotiating “rounds” every decade or so? The 
requirements of clause one no longer have a straightforward interpretation in an 
agreement that lasts for decades rather than a few years, and that is characterized by an 
ever changing set of commitments.  
 For these reasons, I believe, GATT practice evolved over time toward ignoring 
the requirements of the first clause in Article XIX(1).6 National laws to authorize 
safeguard measures soon made no mention of them. Section 201 of the U.S. Trade Act of 
1974, for example, simply requires the International Trade Commission (ITC) to 
determine “whether an article is being imported into the United States in such increased 
quantities as to be a substantial cause7 of serious injury, or the threat thereof.”8 There is 
no requirement that developments be “unforeseen” or that they result from earlier trade 
concessions. At this writing, this statute remains the basis for safeguard measures under 
U.S. law.  
 Such a development is an understandable consequence of the difficulties in giving 
content to the first clause of Article XIX in a long-lived agreement. But as shall become 
                                                 
6See Edmond McGovern, International Trade Regulation 2d ed. §10.211 at 291 (London: Gobefield 
1986). 
7A "substantial cause" is a "cause that it is important and not less than any other cause." 19 U.S.C. § 
2252(b)(1)(B). 
819 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(A). 
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immediately apparent, the absence of this “anchor” for the remainder of Article XIX(1) 
creates other problems. 
B. The Requirements of Serious Injury and Causation 
 Under Article XIX as originally drafted, it was not enough that an unforeseen 
import surge results from a trade concession. The import surge must go on to cause or 
threaten “serious injury.” This phrasing raises other obvious interpretive issues—what is 
“serious injury?” How does one determine whether the “cause” of such injury (or threat 
thereof) is “increased quantities” of imports? 
 On the first question, the text appears deliberately vague. The drafters might have 
made reference to specifics in this regard—lost profits, unemployment, bankruptcies, and 
the like—but chose to leave the term undefined. Perhaps the best inference is that they 
did not want to constrain the concept unduly by attempting a definition, and that they 
would allow a variety of factors into the analysis. 
 On the question of causation, the logic was nevertheless fairly clear. The 
unforeseen import surge, resulting from the trade concession, had to be responsible for 
serious injury. Put differently, the serious injury had to be “caused” by the trade 
concession, via its effect on the level of import competition, in the usual but for sense of 
the term “cause.” Within this framework, the “exogenous” variable is the trade 
concession, and the “increased quantities” of imports were those resulting from that 
concession. Likewise, the level of imports in the absence of the trade concession serves 
as the baseline against which to measure the “increase.”   
 But now imagine reading out the first clause of paragraph one, as GATT members 
began to do many years ago. Then, one must simply have “such increased quantities (of 
imports)...as to cause or threaten serious injury.” The baseline for the “increase,” import 
levels prior to a recent trade concession, is no longer available. Further, the only apparent 
candidate for an exogenous variable is the “increased quantities” of imports, as there is 
no longer any background event from which these “increased quantities” result. 
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 Two considerable problems arise as a result. First, how does one now determine 
whether there are “increased quantities” of imports at all—against what baseline is the 
increase to be measured?  
 Second, and more fundamental, how can one treat increased quantities of imports 
as an exogenous or “causal” variable? Elementary economics suggests that the forces of 
supply and demand, just like price and domestic production, will determine the quantity 
of imports. If imports and domestic products are perfect substitutes, for example, then the 
quantity of imports will equal the difference between domestic demand and domestic 
supply at the equilibrium price. Figure A illustrates the point using the further 
simplifying assumptions that the importing nation is “small” so that it can obtain any 
desired quantity of imports at the “world” price P, and that no trade barriers exist to limit 
imports. Domestic demand is denoted by the downward sloping curve D, and domestic 
supply by the upward sloping curve S. At the world price, the quantity demanded by 
domestic consumers is Qd and the quantity produced by domestic firms is Qs, the 
difference between these quantities equaling the quantity of imports.  
 
Figure A 
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 Within this framework, the exogenous factors are the determinants of domestic 
supply, domestic demand, and the world price. Domestic demand is affected by such 
things as consumer tastes and incomes; domestic supply by the costs of inputs into 
production and the state of available production technology; and world price by these 
same matters (factors affecting supply and demand) in other countries. The quantity of 
imports is then a result of the interaction of these forces; it is not a causal variable at all. 
 Likewise, changes in the quantity of imports will be the result of changes in the 
determinants of domestic supply, demand and the world price. Increased quantities of 
imports may result, for example, from a fall in the world price due to falling input costs 
abroad, to improved production technology abroad, or to weakening demand abroad. 
Increased quantities of imports can also result from an increase in domestic demand 
attributable, for example, to rising consumer incomes. Finally, increased quantities of 
imports can result from increasing costs of domestic production reflected in a leftward 
shift of the domestic supply schedule.  
 Against this backdrop, the question “did increased quantities of imports cause 
serious injury to a domestic industry?” is simply incoherent. Suppose, as an illustration, 
that the domestic industry suffers a decline due to rising costs. As domestic production 
falls at the world price, imports will increase to fill the rising gap between domestic 
demand and supply. Are “increased quantities” of imports the “cause” of this “injury?” 
Certainly not in the usual sense of the term “cause.” By hypothesis, what has changed are 
the costs of domestic firms, and that change results in reduced domestic production and 
increased imports.  
 Hence, once the first clause of Article XIX (1) becomes a nullity, it is by no 
means clear how nations should operationalize their reliance on Article XIX. There is no 
longer any natural baseline against which to measure “increased quantities,” and there is 
no longer any intelligible exogenous variable to assess as potential “cause” of serious 
9 
injury.  The next section will consider how these and other issues were addressed in 
GATT practice. 
C. The Evolution of Safeguards in GATT Practice: The U.S. Experience 
 The history of safeguards actions in the United States offers a window into the 
gradual obsolescence of Article XIX as originally drafted and the legal response to it by 
GATT members. It also illustrates the rise of “extra-legal” measures in the system, and 
the resulting impetus for the WTO Safeguards Agreement.  
 Early reliance on Article XIX by the United States proceeded in accordance with 
its original text. In the so-called “Hatter’s Fur” case of 1951,9 for example, the United 
States withdrew a concession that it had negotiated in 1947 with respect to certain 
women’s hat bodies. A complaint about the measure was referred to a GATT working 
party. The United States argued that an unexpected surge in imports had resulted from its 
1947 concession due to an unforeseen change in fashion that advantaged imports over 
domestic producers—thus, the import surge was an “unforeseen” consequence of 
“obligations incurred.” The working party report was inconclusive as to whether the 
United States had acted appropriately by this standard, but all parties agreed that the U.S. 
action was required to comply with it.  
 As time passed, however, efforts to link import surges to the unforeseen 
consequences of a trade concession were abandoned in the United States. U.S. law no 
longer requires any such linkage as noted earlier. It is instructive to consider how those 
charged with administering the law—principally the ITC—responded to the resulting 
conundrums. 
 1. Increased Imports: The Baseline Issue 
 U.S. law requires the ITC to determine “whether an article is being imported into 
the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious 
                                                 
9Sales No. GATT/1951-3 (Nov. 1951). 
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injury” or threat, without specifying in the statute any baseline against which to assess 
“increased quantities.” The ITC wrestled with the baseline issue for some time.  
 Some Commissioners employed an elastic conception of the proper baseline, 
searching for a time period that they believed was representative of long term trends 
rather than “abnormal economic conditions.” The result might be a baseline extending 
back over a decade.10 Others looked to the time of the most recent trade concessions on 
the product in question to establish the baseline, which often (though not necessarily) 
would have occurred during the last GATT negotiating round.11 Still others emphasized 
the importance of routinizing the baseline, and tended toward a somewhat arbitrary rule 
of thumb.12 The latter view largely carried the day in the end, and it has become 
convention at the ITC to focus on the most recent five-year period for which data are 
available.13 “Increased quantities” will generally be deemed to exist if imports have risen 
during that five-year window, although litigants remain free to argue that import trends 
during that period are for some reason unrepresentative of long term trends. 
 2. Serious Injury 
 Like GATT Article XIX, U.S. law does not attempt to define the concept of 
“serious injury.” Rather, it provides a list of factors for the ITC to consider in evaluating 
serious injury and threat of serious injury, including the idling of productive facilities, 
lack of profitability in the industry, unemployment, and the like.14 No guidance is 
provided on how much weight to give the various factors, however, except to say that no 
one factor is dispositive. The result is a degree of uncertainty as to how cases will be 
decided, although industries typically do not pursue relief under U.S. law unless they are 
                                                 
10U.S. International Trade Commission, Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, Inv. No. TA-201-5, Pub. 
No. 756 (1976)(views of Commissioners Moore and Bedell). The case is also reported in 1 I.T.R.D. 5404 
(1976). 
11Id. (views of Commissioner Minchew). 
12Id. (views of Commissioner Ablondi). 
13Jackson, Davey & Sykes at 611. 
14See 19 U.S.C. §§ 202 (c)(1)(A)-(B). 
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in a general state of malaise, which usually (though not always) will enable them to 
persuade the ITC that serious injury is present or at least threatened.15 
 3. Causation 
 Unlike GATT Article XIX, U.S. law requires a determination whether increased 
quantities of imports are the “substantial cause” of injury or threat, defined as a cause that 
is important and no less important than any other. The ITC is thus obligated to ascertain 
what other possible causes of serious injury or threat may be present, and to determine 
whether any of them may be more important than increased quantities of imports. The 
requirement that the ITC weigh the relative importance of the “causes” of injury might 
seem to make the analysis more complex than GATT Article XIX requires (although I 
will argue below that the distinction is largely illusory). Nevertheless, analysis under 
U.S. law is clearly beset by the same fundamental conceptual problem that plagues any 
reliance on Article XIX without its first clause—what does it mean to treat increased 
quantities of imports as a causal variable? This question has been answered in three 
different ways. 
 Correlation  Causation. By far the predominant response in ITC practice, 
which might be termed the “correlation approach,” is simply to pretend that import 
fluctuations “cause” changes in domestic prices and output even though such economic 
variables are determined simultaneously—both are “endogenous” in economic parlance. 
To this end, ITC Commissioners regularly search for evidence of a correlation between 
rising import volume or market share and measures of industrial decline (falling prices, 
production, employment, profits, and so on). If such a correlation is evident, the 
Commissioners will tend to find that imports have caused injury. Where it is lacking, 
they will tend to find that imports are not responsible for injury. And to decide whether 
⇒
                                                 
15Compare U.S. International Trade Commission, Nonrubber Footwear, Inv. No. TA-201-50, Pub. No. 
1545, 6 I.T.R.D. 1992 (1984)(no injury found) with U.S. International Trade Commission, Nonrubber 
Footwear, Inv. No. TA-201-55, Pub. No. 1717 (1985)(injury found in another investigation of the same 
industry one year later).  
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other possible causes of injury are more important than imports, the Commissioners will 
employ time series data representing those other causes, and examine the strength of the 
correlation between those data and indicators of industrial decline.16   
 The fundamental difficulty with the correlation approach, of course, is that 
correlation and causation are not the same. The elementary price theory that underlies 
Figure A above, for example, suggests an array of possible developments that can cause a 
decline in a domestic industry concurrent with an increase in the quantity or market share 
of imports. A domestic recession might cause injury to domestic firms and a 
simultaneous increase in the market share of imports (if U.S. firms are the marginal 
suppliers), while an increase in the costs of domestic producers can cause a reduction in 
domestic production and an absolute increase in imports. The resulting correlation 
between rising imports and industrial decline will be deemed “causal” by the ITC even 
though both the increase in imports and the decline in the domestic industry are both 
caused by other forces. 
 Hypothetical Quotas. Occasionally, Commissioners or litigants undertake to 
develop more sophisticated analyses that do not confound the concepts of correlation and 
causation. Pindyck & Rotemberg17 conducted an econometric study of the causation issue 
at the behest of the Chilean copper industry in the 1984 investigation of unwrought 
copper imports. After estimating a reduced form model of output and employment in the 
domestic industry, they asked how output and employment would have been affected had 
imports been held to their level at the beginning of the five-year baseline used by the ITC 
to determine whether imports had increased. This technique might be termed the 
“hypothetical quota” approach to determining the impact of imports—the injury caused 
by “increased quantities” is the decline in industrial health that would have been avoided 
                                                 
16For a recent illustration, see U.S. International Trade Commission, Lamb Meat, Inv. No. TA-201-68, 
Pub. No. 3176 (1999). 
17 Pindyck, Robert & Julio Rotemberg. Are Imports to Blame?: Attribution of Injury under the 1974 
Trade Act, 30 J. L. & Econ. 101 (1987). 
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had a hypothetical quota frozen the quantity of imports at its baseline value. The resulting 
injury can then be compared to the injury caused by other potential causes of harm. 
Pindyck and Rotemberg posited that the other causes of injury were a general 
macroeconomic recession and rising domestic labor costs. Their econometric analysis 
suggested that rising imports—or more precisely, the absence of a quota to restrain 
them—were a less important cause of injury than these other factors.  
 The analysis of Pindyck and Rotemberg apparently did not convince the ITC, 
however, which unanimously determined that increased imports were the substantial 
cause of serious injury. Aspects of the hypothetical quota approach to the causal inquiry 
have occasionally appeared in the analysis of Commissioners, but on the whole it has had 
little impact.18 
 The hypothetical quota approach to analysis has one advantage over the 
correlation approach that predominates at the ITC, in that it offers an economically 
coherent conception of how increased quantities of imports “cause” injury. It does so by 
positing an intelligible exogenous variable—the removal of a hypothetical quota—and 
then analyzes the impact of that hypothetical policy change.  Yet, it is by no means clear 
that this approach to causation analysis is the right one. Consider again the example of a 
shock to domestic costs that reduces domestic production and leads to an increase in 
imports. At least some of the resulting harm to domestic firms would be avoided if a 
quota were in place to prevent imports from increasing—the reduced domestic supply 
would then lead to higher prices and more revenue for domestic firms, other things being 
                                                 
18See U.S. International Trade Commission, Certain Motor Vehicles, Inv. No. TA-201-44, Pub. No. 
1110, 2 I.T.R.D. 5241 (1980)(views of Commissioner Alberger). Commissioner Alberger devised a 
technique that came to be known as "shift-share analysis." He posited that injury to domestic automakers 
was due to one of two causes -- the increasing market share of imports, and the decline in U.S. 
consumption (sales) of new motor vehicles. Accordingly, he considered two counterfactuals, one in which 
import share was held constant while consumption fell as it did, and another in which consumption was 
held constant while import share rose as it did. Because the damage to the industry was greater in the first 
counterfactual than in the second, he concluded that declining consumption was a more important cause of 
injury. His analysis can be taken to be a variant of the hypothetical quota approach, with a counterfactual 
quota system that holds import market share constant.  
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equal. Is it proper to say that increased quantities of imports are the cause of injury under 
those conditions? 
 The Import Supply Curve. A third technique for analyzing the causal connection 
between increased quantities of imports and injury has surfaced in the reasoning of a few 
Commissioners, and might be termed the “import supply curve” approach. It has also 
found its way into some academic studies, such as that of Grossman,19 Kelly,20 and 
Irwin.21 This approach draws on standard economic models of international trade to 
divide the potential causes of injury into three groups: forces that cause shifts in the 
domestic supply schedule; forces that cause shifts in the domestic demand schedule; and 
forces that cause shifts in the import supply schedule. Any harm to the domestic industry 
that can be attributed to shifts in the import supply curve will be deemed to result from 
“increased imports;” any harm attributable to rising domestic costs that shift the domestic 
supply schedule will be deemed to result from causes other than increased imports.22 
Likewise, harm due to shifts in domestic demand will be attributed to causes other than 
imports, unless the shift in demand is due to a price reduction on imperfectly 
substitutable imports.23  
 This approach also has the virtue of economic coherence, effectively rewriting the 
statute to ask whether changing conditions of import supply, rather than increased 
quantities of imports, are causally responsible for injury. Once again, however, one may 
reasonably inquire whether this approach is the right one. It permits safeguard measures 
when developments abroad are the principle source of harm to a troubled industry, but on 
what legal theory is that the proper way to limit them? The old Hatter’s Fur case noted 
above is instructive in this regard. The U.S. position in that case was that a decline in 
                                                 
19 Grossman, Gene M. , Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry, 20 J. Int’l 
Econ. 201 (1986). 
20 Kelly, Kenneth, The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases, 37 J. Ind. Econ. 187 (1988). 
21 Irwin, Douglas, Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in U.S. 
Section 201 Cases, NBER Working Paper No. 9815 (2003). 
22See U.S. International Trade Commission, Wood Shakes and Shingles, Inv. No. TA-201-56, Pub. 
No. 1826 (1986)(views of Commissioners Liebeler and Brunsdale).  
23A more detailed explanation of this approach may be found in Kelly (1988). 
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domestic demand for the types of hats produced by domestic firms was the “unforeseen 
development” that resulted in an import surge and that justified safeguards action. The 
working party appeared to accept this theory, at least in principle, while quibbling as to 
whether the facts supported it. 
 In short, absent a clear legal (or economic) theory as to which economic 
developments should permit a safeguards response and which should not, it is difficult to 
asses the merits of the alternative methods of causation analysis that have emerged in 
U.S. practice through the years. It remains to consider whether the new Agreement on 
Safeguards provides additional guidance. 
 Before proceeding, however, I will note one other conceptual difficulty that arises 
under U.S. law, and that will be seen to be present under WTO law in a slightly different 
guise. To determine whether imports are the “substantial cause” of injury, the ITC must 
identify the other possible causes of injury. Implicitly, this requires the ITC to define the 
economic developments that will not justify safeguard measures if they prove to be the 
most important cause of injury. Of the three approaches to the analysis considered above, 
only the import supply curve approach provides a built-in answer to this question—
safeguard measures may not be employed if the predominant cause of injury is a shift in 
domestic demand or in domestic supply. But as noted, it is by no means obvious that 
injury due to such developments should not be permitted to justify safeguards action, or 
that all developments abroad that may shift the import supply curve should be permitted 
to justify safeguards action. The problem becomes even more difficult under the other 
two approaches to causation analysis, as it is altogether unclear what “counts” as a cause 
other than imports.24  
 4. The Rise of Gray Area Measures 
                                                 
24U.S. law must also confront an issue that WTO law avoids -- the proper level of "aggregation" of 
alternative causes. For example, should a domestic recession be viewed as a single cause, or an aggregation 
of various adverse events that affect macroeconomic activity? The issue is important because of the need to 
weigh the relative importance of alternative causes against the effect of imports. The more alternative 
causes are "disaggregated," the more likely that imports will prove more important. WTO law does not 
require this comparative weighing of causes, and thus need not confront the aggregation issue. 
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 Given the many conundrums presented by Article XIX, the reader may wonder 
how the GATT system could have functioned for nearly 50 years without providing much 
guidance as to how these issues should be resolved. The answer, in part, is that formal 
reliance on Article XIX waned over time, and safeguard measures were replaced by 
various extra-legal arrangements. These commonly took the form of government-to-
government negotiations to limit exports. The resulting arrangements were commonly 
termed “voluntary export restraints” or “orderly marketing agreements." Because these 
arrangements did not comply with the formal requirements of Article XIX, they cam to 
be known as "gray area" measures.   
 One drawback of formal safeguard measures from the perspective of an importing 
nation was the “compensation” requirement of Article XIX. Article XIX (2)-(3) provide 
that a party invoking its right to suspend or modify concessions must negotiate with 
adversely affected parties regarding trade compensation. If these negotiations are 
unsuccessful, the safeguard measure may be imposed nevertheless, but injured trading 
partners may suspend “substantially equivalent concessions.” Thus, a nation invoking 
Article XIX had to choose between compensatory trade concessions to affected trading 
partners and the retaliatory suspension of “equivalent” concessions. Both options could 
prove unpalatable. Formal safeguard measures also required industries seeking protection 
to proceed through an expensive administrative process with an uncertain outcome.  
 Against this backdrop, voluntary export restraints have obvious appeal as an 
alternative. Such arrangements contain built-in compensation to adversely affected 
nations in the form of “quota rents”—although exporting nations agree to limit their 
exports, they are allowed to charge what the market will bear in the importing nation for 
the reduced quantity. The resulting price increase (the quota rent) and higher profit 
margin per unit sold may more than compensate the exporting nation for the loss in 
volume of sales. Voluntary restraint agreements can also circumvent the legal 
requirements, and administrative costs, of formal safeguards proceedings.  
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 It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that voluntary restraint arrangements and 
similar arrangements came to be quite common and to a great degree replaced safeguards 
actions. They emerged in a number of important industries. 
 Government to government agreements limiting trade have been especially 
important in the steel industry. The United States negotiated steel export restraint 
agreements with Japan and Europe in the late 1960’s, and a larger network of voluntary 
restraint agreements was negotiated by the Reagan administration in the 1980’s. They 
were extended through 1992. 
 The Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) under GATT and its predecessors in the 
GATT system was another important example. Textile industries in developed nations 
had long been beleaguered by import competition, and the MFA served as a negotiated 
solution to the “problem” for many years. It allocated quota shares for the major 
developed markets among the major developing country suppliers.25  
 Yet another dramatic example of how voluntary restraints came to substitute for 
safeguard measures arose during the Carter administration. The domestic auto industry 
filed a petition for safeguards relief before the ITC, and lost its case on the grounds that 
increased quantities of imports were not the substantial cause of injury. The Carter 
administration proceeded nevertheless to negotiate a voluntary restraint agreement with 
Japan, which remained in force for a number of years. 
 The growth of these arrangements, of course, imposed substantial economic costs 
on the importing nations that employed them. Studies suggested that the annual cost to 
the U.S. economy, for example, was in the tens of billions of dollars.26 Further, voluntary 
restraint agreements and related measures were of potentially indefinite duration. Special 
arrangements for the steel and textile industries, in particular, spanned decades. A 
constituency developed during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations for an end to 
                                                 
25For historical discussion see Jackson, Davey & Sykes, pp. 400-02. 
26See, e.g., David Tarr, A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Welfare and Employment Effects of 
U.S. Quotas in Textiles, Autos and Steel (Washington: FTC, 1989). 
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these arrangements, and efforts to curtail them became central to the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards. 
D. The Safeguards Agreement 
 It is not obvious why trade officials in the GATT system would have regarded the 
growth of extra-legal measures as a terribly onerous development, and the emergence of 
a strong push for reform during the Uruguay Round presents something of a political 
economy puzzle on which I will not linger. But there can be no doubt that a principal 
objective of the safeguards negotiations was to put an end to extra-legal measures, and to 
restore formal legal discipline over the protection of troubled industries.27 
 The negotiations to this end were apparently successful. Article 11(1)(b) of the 
WTO Agreement of Safeguards provides that “a Member shall not seek, take or maintain 
any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar 
measures on the export or the import side.” In addition to this clear prohibition of gray 
area measures, the Agreement sought to remove some of the preexisting incentive to use 
them by altering the compensation requirement. Under the new Agreement, members 
using safeguards “shall endeavor to maintain a substantially equivalent level of 
concessions.”28 But the Agreement also provides that if negotiations over compensation 
are unsuccessful, no right of retaliation exists during the first three years of a safeguards 
measure that conforms to the legal requirements of the Agreement and that follows an 
absolute increase in the level of imports.  Thus, the “threat point” is plainly altered in the 
compensation negotiations, and nations adversely affected by safeguards actions must 
settle for less in compensation lest they walk away with nothing for three years. The 
political price for formal reliance on safeguard measures by an importing nation has thus 
been reduced.  
                                                 
27Bown (2002) provides additional background on the effort to eliminate extra-legal measures in the 
Safeguards Agreement, as well as the puzzle as to why WTO negotiators sought to eliminate such 
measures.  
28Safeguards Agreement, Art. 8(1). 
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 In addition, to address concerns that measures to protect troubled industries had 
often dragged on for years under GATT and had become a substitute for long-term tariff 
protection, the Agreement introduced some bright-line time limits. Safeguards measures 
could last only four years, although they could be extended another four years if a formal 
determination was made that an extension was necessary. Once terminated, safeguard 
measures could not be re-applied to an industry for a length of time equal to the time that 
they had been in effect. Further, any safeguards measure lasting over one year was to be 
liberalized at “regular intervals.”29 
 These elements of the new Agreement do much to address the problem of gray 
area measures and the problem of open-ended safeguards protection, issues that were 
clearly important to the negotiators. But the Agreement accomplishes much less with 
respect to the conceptual questions posed by Article XIX. 
 On the basic preconditions for reliance on Article XIX, the Agreement largely 
parrots U.S. law in stating that a “Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product 
only if that Member has determined.... that such product is being imported into its 
territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry that 
produces like or directly competitive products.”30 Like U.S. law, it omits any reference to 
“unforeseen developments” or the “effect of the obligations incurred.” 
 The only guidance as to the meaning of “serious injury” under this standard and 
the proper approach to the analysis of causation is provided by Article 4 of the 
Agreement, which I reproduce here in pertinent part: 
 
1. For purposes of this Agreement: 
(a) “serious injury” shall be understood to mean significant overall 
impairment in the position of a domestic industry; 
(b) “threat of serious injury” shall be understood to mean serious injury 
that is clearly imminent... 
                                                 
29Id. Art. 7. 
30Id. Art. 2(1).  
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2. (a) In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have 
caused or are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic 
industry...the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an 
objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that 
industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of 
the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the 
domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, 
production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and 
employment. 
(b) The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) shall not be made 
unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, 
the existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product 
concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than 
increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same 
time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.  
Plainly, this provision does not seriously address, let alone resolve, the conundrums 
presented by modern GATT practice under Article XIX. It does not provide any 
guidance, for example, on what it means to say that increased imports are a causal 
variable, or any guidance on what is meant by “factors other than increased 
imports...causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time.” The concept of 
“serious injury” is left quite vague, and members must simply “evaluate” relevant factors. 
Further, although the Agreement nowhere refers to “unforeseen developments” and the 
“effect of the obligations incurred” as a predicate to safeguard measures, it does not 
specifically provide that Article XIX(1), first clause, may henceforth be ignored.  
 Hence, fundamental questions regarding the legal prerequisites for safeguard 
measures remain unanswered by the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. These unresolved 
issues have found their way into WTO disputes.  
II. Safeguards in Appellate Body Jurisprudence Prior to the Steel Case 
 I now turn to an examination of the WTO decisions on safeguard measures, which 
are unsatisfactory in a number of respects. The problem lies largely in the fact that the 
WTO Appellate Body engages in textual interpretation to the exclusion of anything else, 
yet the WTO text on safeguard measures is anything but satisfactory for the reasons 
noted above.   
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 The situation is somewhat reminiscent of early American antitrust law. The 
Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
without defining or otherwise making clear what constitutes a “restraint of trade.” The 
requirements of antitrust law have become reasonably clear over time only through a 
process of common law adjudication that has considered the legality of various business 
practices with the aid of nontextual theorizing about their desirability. Absent a thorough 
renegotiation of the Safeguards Agreement, such a process is also required here, but the 
Appellate Body has steadfastly refused to embark on it. 
A. The Resurrection of Article XIX(1), First Clause 
 As indicated, GATT practice evolved toward ignoring the first clause of Article 
XIX. The Safeguards Agreement says nothing about “unforeseen developments” or the 
“effect of the obligations incurred,” and national laws have ignored these requirements 
for many years. 
 In its first important ruling in a safeguards dispute—Korea—Dairy31—the 
Appellate Body took a different tack. It overruled the findings of the dispute panel in the 
case to the effect that formal compliance with Article XIX(1), first clause, is no longer 
required. The Appellate Body instead held that a treaty interpreter “must give meaning 
and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that 
would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or 
inutility.32” Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement are to be read cumulatively it 
says, and the first clause of Article remains a binding obligation. 
 As for the proper interpretation of the obligation imposed by Article XIX(1), first 
clause, the Appellate Body opined: “[I]it seems to us that the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase ‘as a result of unforeseen developments’ requires that the developments which led 
to a product being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to 
                                                 
31Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R 
(1999). 
32Id. ¶80.  
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cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers must have been 
‘unexpected’. With respect to the phrase ‘of the effect of the obligations incurred by a 
Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions’, we believe that this phrase 
simply means that it must be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, that the importing 
Member has incurred obligations under the GATT 1994, including tariff concessions.33”  
The Appellate Body went on to endorse the reasoning of the working party report in the 
old GATT Hatter’s Fur case, which stated: “… ‘unforeseen developments’ should be 
interpreted to mean developments occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff 
concession which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country 
making the concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the concession 
was negotiated.34”  This line of reasoning was repeated by the Appellate Body in 
Argentina—Footwear,35 which also overruled the dispute panel in the case.  
 Thus, the Appellate Body has fully revived the first clause of Article XIX, and 
has held in these and subsequent decisions that national authorities have failed to 
demonstrate their compliance with it. United States—Lamb,36 in particular, holds that 
WTO members must demonstrate their compliance with the Article XIX(1), first clause, 
prior to the time that a safeguards measure is undertaken. The U.S. ITC’s failure to 
consider the matter in its lamb investigation was “not surprising” given the absence of 
any reference to it in the governing U.S. statute, but that was no defense for the United 
States under WTO law.37  
 One can certainly quarrel with the legal soundness of these decisions. Given the 
uniform practice of ignoring Article XIX(1), first clause, during the latter years of GATT, 
and its omission from the Safeguards Agreement, it is questionable whether the drafters 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements had any intention of reviving the obligation—had 
                                                 
33 Id. ¶84. 
34Id. ¶89. 
35Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999). 
36United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New 
Zealand and Australia WT/DS178/AB/R (2001). 
37Id. ¶73. 
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they wished to alter established GATT practice in this respect, one might argue, they 
would have so indicated with clarity.  The difficult interpretive issues that the clause 
raises in a long-lived agreement, which led to its irrelevance in GATT practice, might 
also have been noted as a basis for letting it remain dormant.  
 Having embraced the opposite view, the Appellate Body might have undertaken 
to explain coherently what Article XIX(1), first clause, now requires. At what point in 
time must the events in question have been unforeseen—the time of the last tariff 
concession? What if the last concession on the product in question was decades ago—
could anything today have been foreseen? What if the product has been the subject of 
numerous tariff concessions over time—are expectations associated with the last 
concession the only relevant ones? Why or why not? How does one establish the 
expectations of trade negotiators as an evidentiary matter? What if there are many 
negotiators and their accounts of their expectations are incongruent? What if most of 
them are dead? This list of questions is assuredly incomplete, and the Appellate Body has 
yet to afford any meaningful guidance regarding the answers.  
 With regard to the “effect of the obligations incurred,” by contrast, the Appellate 
Body apparently offers a construction which enables this requirement to be trivially 
satisfied in every case—a member simply needs to show that it has incurred some 
obligations with respect to the product in question. It is hard to imagine how a dispute 
could arise without such an obligation, since a member with an unbound tariff could 
always raise it unilaterally without any need to rely on a safeguard measure. The 
Appellate Body evidently does not require members to demonstrate that “increased 
quantities” of imports are attributable directly to any recent trade concession. It suffices 
for them to argue that in the absence of a tariff binding, they would be able to raise tariffs 
to eliminate the import surge. 
B. Increased Quantities 
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 As noted, Article XIX originally contemplated that “increased quantities” of 
imports would be measured against baseline levels prior to 1947 GATT concessions. 
Having revived Article XIX(1), first clause, therefore, one might perhaps have expected 
the Appellate Body to require a similar approach to establishing the baseline against 
which the existence of “increased quantities” is assessed, perhaps by looking to import 
levels prior to the most recent concession on the product in question. But it has not taken 
that approach 
 In Argentina—Footwear,38 the Appellate Body considered a case in which 
Argentina had adopted the approach embraced some years earlier by the U.S. ITC—a 
five year “rule of thumb” for establishing the import baseline. The dispute panel in the 
case concluded that it is “reasonable to examine the trend in imports over a five-year 
historical period.39”  But the Appellate Body focused on language from the second clause 
of Article XIX(1) and its counterpart in Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement: “any 
product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased 
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury.” The 
phrase “is being imported,” according to the Appellate Body, “indicates that it is 
necessary for the competent authorities to examine recent imports, and not simply trends 
in imports during the past five years—or, for that matter, during any other period of 
several years.40” “In our view, the determination of whether the requirement of imports 
‘in such increased quantities’ is met is not a merely mathematical or technical 
determination. In other words, it is not enough for an investigation to show simply that 
imports of the product this year were more than last year—or five years ago. Again, and 
it bears repeating, not just any increased quantities of imports will suffice. There must be 
‘such increased quantities’ as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic 
industry in order to fulfill this requirement for applying a safeguard measure. And this 
                                                 
38Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999). 
39Id. ¶130. 
40Id. 
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language in both Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:1(a) of the 
GATT 1994, we believe, requires that the increase in imports must have been recent 
enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause ‘serious injury’.41”  
 Thus, the Appellate Body insists that imports must have increased “recently.” But 
how recently, and in what amount? The phrase “recent enough, sudden enough, sharp 
enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten 
to cause ‘serious injury’” hardly provides useful guidance. The insistence on “not just 
any increase” but “such increased quantities” as to cause injury is equally unhelpful. And 
one must again confront the fundamental issue that all of this verbiage avoids—what 
does it mean to say that increased quantities of imports “cause” injury when they are, as 
an economic matter, a result of a variety of possible developments? Far from lending 
badly needed clarification, the Appellate Body’s treatment of the “increased quantities” 
requirement only adds to the confusion. 
C. Serious Injury 
 Like Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, the Appellate Body has not 
attempted to define “serious injury” with any precision. Its focus has been primarily on 
the text of Article 4.2, which simply provides: “the competent authorities shall evaluate 
all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the 
situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of 
the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market 
taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, 
capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment.” According to the Appellate 
Body, the text requires that all of the listed factors be “evaluated” in every case, and it 
has found safeguard measures wanting under WTO law whenever a member has failed to 
                                                 
41 Id. ¶131. 
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discuss one or more of these factors in its official report on safeguard action.42  The 
Appellate Body has further held that the obligation to evaluate “all relevant factors” may 
extend to factors not raised by any of the parties to the safeguards investigation.43  
 Otherwise, the Appellate Body has simply insisted that serious injury represents 
“significant overall impairment” as stated in Article 4.1 of the Safeguards Agreement.44 It 
characterizes this standard as “high” and “exacting.45” It is not necessary that every 
“relevant factor” reflect industrial decline, however, for serious injury to be present—“a 
certain factor may not be declining, but the overall picture may nevertheless demonstrate 
‘significant overall impairment.’46”  
 On the whole, therefore, the Appellate Body has provided relatively little 
guidance on the meaning of “serious injury,” a situation that is perhaps understandable 
given the vagueness of the pertinent textual obligations. Beyond a requirement that all 
factors listed in the Safeguards Agreement be “evaluated” in each case, it remains unclear 
what conditions will support a finding of serious injury or threat, and what degree of 
deference on the matter will be afforded to national authorities. 
D. Causation 
 The Appellate Body has addressed the causal relationship between increased 
quantities of imports and serious injury in several opinions prior to the steel case. None 
of them, however, provides a clear answers to the conceptual difficulties identified in 
Section I. 
                                                 
42See Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999), ¶121. 
43See United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European 
Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R (2001), ¶55. 
44To date, the Appellate Body has largely refrained from detailed commentary on the reasoning behind 
findings of "serious injury" by national authorities. The most notable exception is United States -- 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia 
WT/DS178/AB/R (2001). The U.S. ITC had found lamb prices in the United States to be "depressed" even 
though they were generally higher than four or five years earlier. And it had found a threaten of serious 
injury even though prices had risen toward the end of its period of investigation. The Appellate Body held 
these findings to be insufficient to support the ITC determination. Id. ¶¶157-59.  
45United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New 
Zealand and Australia WT/DS178/AB/R (2001), ¶124. 
46Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999), ¶139. 
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 Argentina—Footwear briefly addresses the proper method for determining 
whether imports are the “cause” of injury. The dispute panel in the case had indicated 
that “if causation is present, an increase in imports normally should coincide with a 
decline in the relevant injury factors.47” The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that 
“in an analysis of causation, ‘it is the relationship between the movements in imports 
(volume and market share) and the movements in injury factors that must be central to a 
causation analysis and determination.’ Furthermore, with respect to a ‘coincidence’ 
between an increase in imports and a decline in the relevant injury factors, we note that 
the Panel simply said that this should ‘normally’ occur if causation is present.48”  
 Hence, in its first important statement on the subject, the Appellate Body 
seemingly endorses what was termed the “correlation approach” to causation analysis in 
Section I. In so doing, it tips its hat to the notion that correlation and causation are not the 
same, but implies that they “normally” go hand in hand. One has no sense that the 
Appellate Body is aware of (or at least troubled by) the profound conceptual difficulty in 
confounding the two in a setting where the ostensible “causal” variable is in fact 
endogenous. 
 The other Appellate Body opinions on causal analysis focus principally on the so-
called “nonattribution requirement” of Article 4.2 of the Safeguards Agreement. It 
provides that safeguard measures may not be employed unless the “investigation 
demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between 
increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When 
factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the 
same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.” One question raised 
by this language during the course of various disputes has been whether the harm 
“caused” by increased imports (again suspending the issue of what it means to treat 
                                                 
47Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999), ¶141. 
48Id. ¶144. 
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increased imports as causal) must by itself suffice to cause serious injury, or must simply 
contribute to serious injury, perhaps along with other factors. To this ill-posed question, 
the Appellate Body has responded that “the Agreement on Safeguards does not require 
that increased imports be “sufficient” to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury. Nor 
does that Agreement require that increased imports “alone” be capable of causing, or 
threatening to cause, serious injury.49”  
 Although increased imports need not account for all of the serious injury, the 
Appellate Body nevertheless underscores the importance of ensuring that injury caused 
by “factors other than increased imports” “not be attributed to increased imports.” To 
make sense of these dual principles, one can only assume that the Appellate Body is 
concerned about situations in which increased imports have not made any causal 
contribution to serious injury, and where serious injury is nevertheless wrongly 
“attributed” to imports.  
 It has found fault with members’ “nonattribution analysis” on multiple occasions. 
In United States—Wheat Gluten50, the volume of imports had risen 38 percent during the 
five-year period of investigation employed by the ITC. Over the same period, U.S. 
productive capacity had grown 68 percent. Capacity utilization at U.S. firms had fallen 
considerably along with profits, however, and the U.S. ITC had linked the decline in 
profitability to declining capacity utilization rates.51   
 One issue before the Appellate Body was whether the U.S. ITC had incorrectly 
“attributed” injury caused by the expansion of U.S. capacity to rising imports. On this 
question, the Appellate Body noted that had U.S. capacity not risen over the period of 
investigation, its capacity utilization rate would have fallen only modestly even with the 
                                                 
49United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New 
Zealand and Australia WT/DS178/AB/R (2001), ¶170. See also United States—Definitive Safeguard 
Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities WT/DS166/AB/R (2001), ¶70. 
50United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European 
Communities WT/DS166/AB/R (2001). 
51Id. ¶¶81, 84. 
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increased volume of imports.52 Further, had imports maintained their market share over 
the period of investigation, capacity utilization rates still would have fallen significantly 
due to the increased capacity brought on line.53 In the face of this evidence, the Appellate 
Body concluded that the U.S. ITC had not “adequately evaluated the complexities” and 
had not ensured that injury attributable to other factors is not attributed to imports.54   
 The Wheat Gluten opinion is problematic in a number of respects. First, as with 
the other Appellate Body opinions on causation, it does nothing to help with the question 
of how to conceptualize imports as a causal variable. Second, taking seriously for a 
moment the notion that imports are “causal,” it was undisputed in the case that they had 
risen substantially during the period of investigation, while the profitability of domestic 
producers had fallen. Given the Appellate Body’s earlier pronouncements that a 
correlation of this sort is “normally” present when a causal connection exists, and that 
imports need not account for all serious injury, one wonders why this evidence was not 
enough. The logic of the Appellate Body opinion seems to suggest that the problems 
suffered by U.S. producers were caused by two factors—rising imports, and investment 
in new capacity that proved unnecessary. In the absence of either factor, U.S. producers 
would have been considerably more profitable. Why, then, is it inappropriate to attribute 
at least part of the “serious injury” to imports? 
 Finally, and as the United States had argued, much of the increase in capacity was 
put in place before imports began to increase.55 The sequence of events thus suggested 
that U.S. producers had invested in new capacity in anticipation of growth opportunities, 
but that imports had increased to capture those growth opportunities and render the new 
investment uneconomical. It could thus be argued that the unexpected surge in imports 
was the real “problem,” and that investments in capacity were not a conceptually distinct 
                                                 
52Id. ¶85. 
53Id. ¶86. 
54Id. ¶ 91. 
55Id. ¶87 
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cause of injury but rather a background predicate for the injury caused by imports. To 
this line of argument, the Appellate Body Responded: “[T]he relevance of an ‘other 
factor’, under Article 4.2(b), depends on whether that ‘other factor’ was, or was not, 
‘causing injury’ ‘at the same time’ as increased imports. Therefore, the possible 
relevance of the increases in capacity added during the period of investigation does not 
depend on the moment in time when the increases in capacity occurred, but on when the 
effects of those increases are felt, and whether they are ‘causing injury’ ‘at the same 
time’ as increased imports.56”  This response simply begs the question as to why 
domestic investments in new capacity should be considered an “other factor” distinct 
from imports as a cause of injury, if indeed the anticipated recoupment of those 
investments was frustrated by an unexpected import surge. The U.S. ITC had treated 
capacity investments as an alternative cause of injury to be sure (and dismissed them as 
less important), and the Appellate Body simply seemed to accept it as an “other factor” 
without reflection.   
 The decision in United States—Lamb57 is similar in this last respect. The U.S. ITC 
had considered six factors other than increased imports that might have contributed to 
serious injury: “the cessation of subsidy payments under the National Wool Act of 1954; 
competition from other meat products, such as beef, pork and poultry; increased input 
costs; overfeeding of lambs; concentration in the packing segment of the industry; and a 
failure to develop and maintain an effective marketing program for lamb meat.58” The 
Appellate Body again seemed to accept these factors uncritically, and simply inquired 
whether the United States had done enough to ensure that injury caused by these factors 
was not “attributed” to imports. Once again it found the analysis of the ITC wanting, 
suggesting that it consisted of conclusory assertions without reasoned explanation.59  
                                                 
56Id. ¶88.  
57United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New 
Zealand and Australia WT/DS178/AB/R (2001). 
58Id. at ¶182, n. 57.  
59 Id. ¶¶185-86. 
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Along the way it added: “We emphasize that the method and approach WTO Members 
choose to carry out the process of separating the effects of increased imports and the 
effects of the other causal factors is not specified by the Agreement on Safeguards. What 
the Agreement requires is simply that the obligations in Article 4.2 must be respected 
when a safeguard measure is applied.60” Evidently, members can use any analytical 
method they wish that complies with Article 4.2, yet the Appellate Body offers no 
counsel as to what the set of permissible methods might include.  
 Finally, in United States—Line Pipe,61 the U.S. ITC had considered the possibility 
that decreased oil and gas drilling was a more important cause of injury than increased 
imports, and had concluded to the contrary.  Once again, however, its analysis was 
deemed insufficient—the “cited parts of the USITC Report do not establish explicitly, 
with a reasoned and adequate explanation, that injury caused by factors other than the 
increased imports was not attributed to increased imports. The passage on page I-30 of 
the USITC Report highlighted by the United States is but a mere assertion that injury 
caused by other factors is not attributed to increased imports.62”   
 In sum, the Appellate Body decisions prior to the steel case regarding the causal 
analysis required by the Safeguards Agreement suggest the following principles: (a) 
correlation is typically the best evidence of causation; (b) the “other factors” considered 
by national authorities during the course of their investigations will be accepted 
uncritically without any reflection as to their logical relevance; and (c) the Appellate 
Body will not tell nations how to conduct their “nonattribution analysis,” but will insist 
that it contain “reasoned and adequate explanation,” which has so far been lacking in 
every case. Thus far, the Appellate Body offers no theory as to how imports are to be 
viewed as causal, or as to how members should determine what constitutes a potential 
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Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R (2001). 
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“other factor.” In other words, the Appellate Body offers no useful guidance on this front 
as to when safeguards are permissible and when they are not. It faults the lack of 
“adequate explanation” in the decisions of national authorities, yet its own explanation of 
the permissible role for safeguard measures could hardly be less instructive. 
 
 
III. The Steel Dispute 
 The recent steel dispute raised all of the issues noted above, and others. The panel 
decision hints at a partial resolution of the "unforeseen developments" puzzle, but makes 
little progress on other fronts. The Appellate Body decision breaks no new ground at all, 
and holds the steel safeguards imposed by the United States to be illegal for predictable 
reasons in light of the prior cases.  
A. Background to the Dispute 
 The steel investigation was initiated by the ITC at the request of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) in June, 2001. The request covered four broad categories 
of steel products, which were divided into thirty-three categories by the ITC for purposes 
of data collection. Ultimately, the ITC defined twenty-seven separate "industries" 
producing steel products within the scope of the investigation. For each of these 
industries, the ITC proceeded to determine whether imports had increased, and if so, 
whether increased imports were a substantial cause of serious injury or threat of injury. 
This analysis resulted in negative determinations for fifteen industries, affirmative 
determinations for eight industries, and "divided" determinations (a 3-3 vote) for four 
industries.63  
 Under U.S. law, a negative determination by the ITC precludes any action by the 
President to impose a safeguard measure. Affirmative determinations and divided 
                                                 
63USITC, Certain Steel Products, Inv. No. TA-201-73, (USITC Pub. No. 3479, December, 2001), Vol. 
I (hereafter USITC Report). 
33 
determinations are forwarded to the President for consideration of possible relief, along 
with remedial recommendations which the President is not bound to follow. As to some 
products, the ITC recommended that imports from nations with which the United States 
has preferential trading arrangements—including Canada, Mexico, Israel and Jordan—be 
exempted from any safeguard measures. 
 After the conclusion of an inter-agency review process, the President instituted 
ten distinct safeguard "measures" covering various steel products, which generally 
excluded imports from preferential trading partners. Eight WTO members (including the 
European Community) challenged the measures pursuant to the WTO dispute resolution 
process, and the proceedings were consolidated before a single panel. The panel ruled 
against the United States on all of the challenged measures, on multiple grounds. The 
Appellate Body affirmed the ruling in considerable part, leading to the eventual 
dismantling of the measures in December, 2003. 
B. The Panel Decision 
 The challenges to the U.S. steel safeguard measures collectively attacked every 
aspect of their legal basis. The panel exercised judicial economy to avoid reaching 
arguments regarding the definition of "industry" in the U.S. investigation and the 
existence of serious injury. Its findings instead focused on four areas: the existence of 
"unforeseen developments" as a predicate for safeguards; the question whether steel 
imports had increased in "such increased quantities" as to permit safeguards; the causal 
link between increased imports and injury; and the lack of "parallelism" between the 
injury analysis and the remedial measures.64 
 1. Unforeseen Developments 
 U.S. law has yet to be amended to require that increased imports result from 
unforeseen developments, and the initial ITC decision in the steel case predictably paid 
                                                 
64United States -- Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248-49, 
251-54, 258-59/R (July 2003) (hereafter Panel Rep.). 
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little heed to the issue. But prior to the imposition of the steel safeguard measures in 
March 2002, the USTR requested additional information from the ITC regarding 
unforeseen developments, and received a supplemental report on that issue in February. 
Based in large part on this supplemental report, the United States argued before the panel 
that four unforeseen developments had contributed to the influx of imports that had 
injured the U.S. steel industry: the Asian financial crisis; the drop in demand for steel due 
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the unexpected strength of U.S. demand for steel; 
and the persistent appreciation of the U.S. dollar.65 Among other arguments, the 
complainants urged that none of these events were "unforeseen," and questioned whether 
they had resulted in increased imports sufficient to justify safeguards.  
 In assessing these issues, the panel began by noting that the parties agreed that 
"the point in time at which developments should have been unforeseen is that of the 
completion of the Uruguay Round."66 The panel allowed that the Asian financial crisis 
could constitute an unforeseen development "since it took place after the United States 
last negotiated its tariff concessions on the steel products covered by the investigation."67 
The same was true of the consequences for the steel market of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, even though that process had begun prior to the end of the Uruguay Round. 
The ongoing strength of the U.S. economy and the U.S. dollar were harder to regard as 
unforeseeable, but the panel concluded that these factors were not viewed by the ITC as 
unforeseen developments in themselves, but simply circumstances that contributed to the 
increase in imports that resulted from the developments in Asia and the Soviet Union.  
Thus, the United States prevailed on the proposition that unforeseen developments had 
affected the steel market to some degree. 
 According to the text of GATT Article XIX, however, the unforeseen 
developments must produce increased imports that cause serious injury or threat. It was 
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on this issue that the United States failed to persuade the panel, in part because the ITC 
findings of injury were all contained in the original ITC report rather than its 
supplemental report—at no time prior to its affirmative injury findings did the ITC 
identify the increased imports that had resulted from the unforeseen developments and 
analyze their impact on the domestic industry. Such analysis was required, according to 
the panel, for every line of steel products (every "industry") in which a safeguard 
measure was taken.68 Instead, the ITC had simply asserted in its supplemental report, 
after the original injury findings had been made, that unforeseen developments had 
affected the steel market in a general way—as the panel stated, "in light of the 
complexity of the matter, a more sophisticated and detailed economic analysis was called 
for."69 
 Analysis. The panel's treatment of the unforeseen developments issue is helpful in 
suggesting how to operationalize this requirement in practice, but at the same time 
underscores that it is a potentially severe hurdle for any nation that seeks to employ 
safeguard measures. As to the questions posed earlier in this essay—unforeseen by 
whom? at what point in time?—the panel suggests that the relevant actors are trade 
negotiators, and that the relevant time is the point when the member seeking to use 
safeguards "last negotiated its tariff concessions on the...products covered by the 
investigation." The end of the Uruguay Round may be taken to have "reset the clock" on 
this latter issue, as GATT members formally withdrew from their old GATT obligations 
at the end of the Round and entered a new (WTO) treaty, even if the tariff bindings on 
many products did not change. 
 In deciding whether events were "unforeseen" by the negotiators at the relevant 
time, the focus in the first instance will be on whether the events in question took place 
before or after the conclusion of the negotiations. One can thus imagine the rules here 
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evolving in a manner that is roughly consistent with the rules in nonviolation cases—a 
presumption might arise that negotiators foresee the results of events that take place 
before the conclusion of negotiations, and do not foresee the results of events that take 
place later.70 As tariffs decline to minimal levels and more and more time passes since 
the last concession, the set of "unforeseen" events will presumably expand and 
unforeseen developments should become easier to identify. 
 But the requirement of linkage between unforeseen developments and particular 
import increases, and the further requirement that these imports be linked to serious 
injury or threat, pose substantial analytical challenges. It is hardly clear what sort of 
"more sophisticated and detailed economic analysis" will suffice. Consider the steel case 
itself: By the panel's reasoning, the United states should have ascertained precisely how 
much U.S. imports had increased, in each of twenty-seven steel "industries," as a result of 
the Asian financial crisis and the drop in demand for steel inside the old Soviet Union. It 
should then have analyzed whether this increase caused or threatened to cause serious 
injury to the relevant industry (as well as provide a convincing "nonattribution" analysis, 
discussed further below). On the surface, such an analysis seems to call for a global 
general equilibrium model of each segment of the steel market, so that the effect of 
events in particular overseas markets such as Asia and the former Soviet Union can be 
simulated with precision. If that sort of analysis is indeed required, the time and expense 
involved could be enormous. The accuracy of such exercises is also subject to 
considerable doubt because the results often turn on controversial assumptions. And for 
many industries, the data necessary to estimate the parameters for such models will be 
lacking, and modelers would have little choice but to fall back on simulations that rest on 
seat of the pants guesses about relevant supply and demand elasticities, cross-elasticities 
of demand, and the like.  The potential boon for consulting economists is readily 
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apparent, but one must harbor no illusions that the task of undertaking such analysis is 
straightforward—if done properly, it is expensive, time-consuming, and inevitably 
fraught with the potential for serious error. Perhaps a future reviewing panel would be 
satisfied with something less daunting (and thus less rigorous and even more error 
prone), but the question of what will suffice as a "reasoned and adequate explanation" of 
the linkage between unforeseen developments and injury remains unclear at best. 
 To be sure, the great virtue of requiring a linkage between unforeseen 
developments and injury, via the effect of unforeseen developments on import quantities, 
is that a coherent exogenous variable thereby resurfaces in the analysis—one asks not 
whether "increased imports" have caused injury in the abstract, but whether particular 
unforeseen developments have caused injury, via an effect on the relative competitive 
position of imported and domestic goods. The question that national authorities are asked 
to answer is once again economically intelligible, as it was at the outset of GATT.   
 The problem of "nonattribution" might also appear to become more tractable—
one might say that as long as the unforeseen developments cause increased imports, in 
turn resulting in injury or threat, then by definition injury has not been "attributed" to any 
factor other than imports. The task of identifying the other factors to which import-
related injury must not be "attributed," and of assessing their impact, could arguably be 
put to the side. Conceptual issues still remain, however, as to what is permitted to "count" 
as an unforeseen development. Imagine, for example, an "unforeseen" shock in the 
domestic market for inputs into steelmaking that raises the cost of steel production in the 
United States. U.S. steelmakers raise their prices to cover costs, and imports flood into 
the U.S. market to undercut the price increases and market shares of domestic firms. Such 
"increased imports" may surely be said to cause injury (relative to a counterfactual world 
in which the imports are not permitted to increase), and to result from the unforeseen 
developments in the domestic input market. But are safeguard measures appropriate 
when the root cause of injury is a shock in the domestic economy? Or would safeguards 
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to remedy such injury be impermissible because the injury caused by the domestic shock 
is wrongly "attributed" to imports? Nothing in the WTO decisions thus far afford much 
help with such matters, an issue about which I will say more below in connection with 
the "nonattribution" problem. 
 2. Increased Imports and the Baseline Question 
 Taking its cue from earlier Appellate Body decisions, the panel held "that the use 
of the present tense in the verb phrase 'is being imported' in both Article 2.1 of the 
Agreement of Safeguards and Article XIX:(1)(A) of the GATT 1994 indicates that it is 
necessary for the competent authorities to examine recent imports and that the increase in 
imports was 'recent'."71 Further, "the emergency nature of safeguard measures calls for an 
assessment of whether imports increased suddenly so that the situation became one of 
emergency."72 And finally, "[i]n light of the Panel's above conclusion that the competent 
authority must have determined that imports increased suddenly and recently, the Panel 
will generally focus its analysis on the situation of imports in the more recent period that 
preceded the end of the period of investigation."73 
 The panel then proceeded to examine the data on import trends for each of the ten 
product categories covered by the challenged measures. In most instances, the panel 
generated a graph representing the import volume and market share data over the five-
year period of investigation employed by the ITC. Because the panel's focus was on the 
"more recent period that preceded the end of the period of investigation," the graph for 
each product category says much about how the panel came out in each case. I reproduce 
four of the graphs below for purposes of illustration: 
  
HOT-ROLLED BAR 
                                                 
71Panel Rep. ¶10.159. 
72Id. ¶10.166. 
73Id. ¶ 10.175. 
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 For both hot-rolled bar and stainless steel rod, the panel found that the ITC report 
did not contain a "reasoned and adequate" explanation of why imports had increased. 
Regarding hot-rolled bar, the panel focused on the ITC's "failure to account for the most 
recent data from interim 2001...The decrease from interim 2000 (1.34 million tons) to 
interim 2001 (952,392 tons) represented a decrease by 28.9%, whereas the increase in the 
year-to-year period before (1999 to 2000) that was characterized as "rapid and dramatic" 
was merely 11.9%. In light of this decrease in the most recent period, the Panel does not 
believe that the trend of imports from 1996 to 2000 (an increase by 52.5%) is sufficient to 
provide a basis for a finding that, at the moment of the determination, hot-rolled bar 'is 
being imported in such increased quantities.'"74  
 The analysis was similar in many respects for stainless steel rod. "The USITC 
relied on the increase occurring between 1996 and 2000, with the largest increase from 
1999 to 2000 (25%). The decline between interim 2000 and interim 2001 was 
acknowledged, but the USITC did not give an explanation why it nevertheless found that 
there was an increase of imports in absolute numbers. This failure is particularly serious 
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since this decrease (by 31.3%) was sharper than the preceding increase, and, as a matter 
of proportion, offset the increase of the two preceding years."75  
 For rebar, by contrast, the panel accepted the ITC finding of increased imports: 
"In light of the tripling of imports, the decrease over the last 18 months is not significant 
enough in order to stand in the way of a conclusion that rebar "is being imported in such 
increased quantities". 76 Likewise, as to stainless steel bar, the panel found that "in the 
light of the significant increase from 1999 to 2000 (19.3 percentage points), the decline 
by 3.3 percentage points from interim 2000 to interim 2001 is, contrary to what the 
European Communities has stated, insignificant. It simultaneously does not detract from 
a finding that imports, relative to domestic production, remain at high levels so that 
stainless steel bar 'is being imported in (such) increased quantities.'" 77  
 For two product categories, tin mill products and stainless steel wire, the panel 
ruled that the United States failed to demonstrate the presence of increased imports 
because it had relied on the separate opinions of ITC Commissioners who had defined the 
relevant “industries” in different ways. For example, some treated “tin mill products” as a 
separate industry, while another included tin mill products in a broader industry. The 
panel was of the view that the separate findings reached in such fashion could not 
collectively constitute a “reasoned and adequate” explanation for the finding of increased 
imports. 
 Analysis. The panel's reasoning focused on two issues in each instance; whether 
imports had risen substantially over the entire period of investigation (the five-year 
period ordinarily used by the ITC as its baseline), and whether any recent downtrend in 
imports had undercut the finding of an overall increase. Implicitly, recent trends carry 
more weight than the five -year trend, but a modest recent decline in imports would not 
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prevent a finding of increased imports if the five-year trend was more dramatically 
upward. 
 The panel's approach is at least somewhat puzzling. Having held earlier that the 
United States should have linked import increases to the Asian financial crisis and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, one might have expected the panel to suggest that the 
timing of those events defines the baseline for measuring the increase in imports. Instead, 
as under longstanding U.S. practice, the panel (and the complainants) seems to accept 
that the arbitrary five-year baseline is permissible in principle: "The complainants do not 
challenge the choice of a five-year period of investigation per se. Complainants rather 
disagree with the fact that, generally, the USITC did not focus sufficiently on the 
situation of imports in the latest part of the period of investigation."78 
 The great emphasis on the most recent year or months of data is peculiar in 
another respect. The time series for imports of any good may exhibit significant volatility 
for a variety of reasons, and the notion that WTO members would wish to condition the 
right to use safeguards heavily on the most recent import fluctuations, which may be 
quite unpredictable when an investigation is initiated, seems odd even if it has some 
arguable textual basis. The preamble to the Agreement on Safeguards emphasizes the 
importance of "structural adjustment," much as U.S. law has long set forth the alternative 
goals of promoting industrial competitiveness or facilitating an orderly industrial 
contraction.79 If these stated goals are to be taken seriously, they concern measures to 
address long-term structural trends. Likewise, Article 7 of the Safeguards Agreement 
provides that safeguard measures may be imposed for four years, with the possibility of 
an extension to eight years. The potential duration of the measures is also suggestive of 
the notion that they address long-term trends in industrial competitiveness. If this is right, 
why should the opportunity to utilize safeguard measures turn critically on recent import 
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fluctuations rather than long-term import trends? One wonders whether the panel here, 
and the Appellate Body generally, has turned the matter completely on its head. 
 3. Causation and the “Nonattribution” Problem 
 The panel found fault with the ITC analysis of causation for nine of the ten 
"industries" covered by the U.S. safeguard measures. In each instance, it held that the 
ITC failed to demonstrate a causal link between increased imports and injury, that it 
failed to ensure that injury caused by other factors was not "attributed" to imports, or 
both. 
 a. Demonstrating the Causal Link to Imports 
 Again taking its cue from prior decisions, the panel suggested that a causal 
linkage between increased imports and injury might be established in one of two ways: 
through a "coincidence" analysis, or through an analysis of the conditions of competition. 
A coincidence analysis examines the "temporal relationship between the movements in 
imports and the movements in injury factors."80 Such coincidence is "normally" evident 
"if causation is present,"81 although the suggestion that a temporal lag may exist between 
import increases and injury "may have merit in certain cases."82 Where a clear 
coincidence exists, "no further analysis is required of the competent authority," save for a 
careful nonattribution analysis.83 Where coincidence is lacking or an analysis of 
coincidence has not been undertaken, the competent authority must explain its absence 
and must show causation convincingly through other means. 
 An analysis of the conditions of competition requires the competent authority to 
consider the factors enumerated in Article 4.2(a) of the Safeguards Agreement: changes 
in import volume, import market share, domestic sales, production, productivity, capacity 
utilization, profits and losses, and employment. Other unenumerated factors may also be 
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relevant.84 Further, "price...in the Panel's view, is an important, if not the most important, 
factor in analysing the conditions of competition in a particular market...we consider that 
relative price trends as between imports and domestic products will often be a good 
indicator of whether injury is being transmitted to the domestic industry...given that price 
changes have an immediate effect on profitability, all other things being equal."85 
 Against this backdrop, the panel proceeded to consider the analysis of the ITC as 
to each of the challenged measures. In the important category of certain carbon flat-rolled 
steel (CCFRS), for example, it found "that there was no coincidence between, on the one 
hand, import trends and the situation of the domestic industry of CCFRS, as reflected in 
data for production, net commercial sales, productivity and capacity utilization of the 
domestic CCFRS. We have also found that there was a lack of coincidence between 
import trends and declines in domestic operating margin...We did discern coincidence, 
albeit lagged, between increased imports, on the one hand, and employment, on the other 
hand...Having taken into consideration all of the foregoing, in the Panel's view, overall, 
coincidence did not exist."86 "Given a lack of coincidence between import trends and the 
injury factors, it was for USITC to provide a compelling explanation as to why a causal 
link was considered, nevertheless, to exist."87 
 The ITC's analysis of the conditions of competition for CCFRS was then found 
deficient as well. The panel first suggested that the product category might be too broad 
for such an analysis to be undertaken at all in convincing fashion. Further, the ITC 
apparently relied heavily on evidence of import underselling and downward price trends 
for both imports and domestic products for two sub-products in the CCFRS category, 
without explaining "why pricing data for the other three items that constituted CCFRS 
were not specifically considered." And, "while some of the domestically produced 
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constituent items were undersold by the import counterparts at particular points during 
the period of investigation, this was not necessarily the case for the entire period of 
investigation."88 Thus, the conditions of competition analysis failed to support the 
existence of a causal link between increased imports and injury. 
 As to other product lines, the panel found the ITC's analysis more convincing. For 
fittings, flanges and tool joints (FFTJ), the panel examined the relation between imports 
and indicators of injury, and noted that "clear coincidence exists between the upward 
trend in imports and the downward trend in the injury factors, except for productivity." 
Because the ITC report had not analyzed this coincidence in detail, however, the panel 
also found that a conditions of competition analysis was required to support the ITC's 
finding of a causal link.89 In that regard, the panel reviewed data assembled by the ITC 
showing that imported products significantly undersold domestic products during the 
period of investigation, and on that basis concluded that the conditions of competition 
analysis supported the existence of a causal link. 
 In the case of hot-rolled bar, the panel noted that the ITC had not undertaken a 
coincidence analysis. But as part of its analysis of the conditions of competition, the ITC 
assembled data on market penetration by imports along with import and domestic prices. 
The data were presented in the following graph: 
 
                                                 
88Id. ¶10.379. 
89Id. ¶10.516. 
47 
Imports vs imports unit values and domestic unit values
(Tons and $/ton)
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Years
To
ns
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
$/
to
n
Imports Imports (semi-annual)
Domestic unit values Imports unit values
Domestic unit values (semi-annual) Imports unit values (semi-annual)
 
Based on these data, the panel concurred that a causal link was present—"[t]he USITC 
explained that domestic prices declined in an effort to mitigate the erosion of market 
share....On the basis of the foregoing, overall, we find that the USITC's conditions of 
competition analysis was compelling."90 
 Analysis. It would be unfair to fault the panel for following the analytic lead of 
the Appellate Body and the ITC, but in doing so it followed them to the land of economic 
gibberish. The panel insists that the linchpin in the search for causation is a search for 
coincidence.  The irony of that phrasing is glaring—the Random House English 
dictionary defines "coincidence" as "a striking occurrence of two or more events at one 
time apparently by mere chance."  The most elementary statistics class teaches that 
correlation is not causation, and the problem is not ameliorated by relabeling correlation 
as coincidence. 
 Further, as explained earlier, the problem is actually much more fundamental. It is 
not disreputable to examine correlation as an aid to an exploration of causation with 
appropriate caveats. But one can only do so when one variable is a logical candidate for 
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the cause of the other. Import quantities do not cause anything—they are simultaneously 
determined along with prices, domestic output, domestic employment, and so on. It 
makes no more sense to say that increased imports caused a decline in domestic 
production, for example, than to say the exact opposite. 
 The "conditions of competition" analysis that serves as an alternative to 
coincidence analysis is no more comforting. To the extent that the panel, like the ITC, 
finds evidence of import "underselling" to be persuasive evidence of causation, an 
economist would respond that persistent underselling by imports is simply evidence that 
they are of lower perceived quality for some reason. It says nothing about a causal link 
between anything and anything else. Likewise, to the degree that a high degree of 
correlation exists between the price series for imported and domestic goods, that fact is 
some evidence that the goods are reasonably close substitutes in consumption. Again, no 
inference of "causation" is supported, as indeed there is no intelligible causal variable 
under examination. 
 To be sure, cases will arise in which "coincidence" is relatively stronger or 
weaker. Cases will arise in which imported goods undersell domestic goods, and many 
cases will arise in which import and domestic price trends are highly correlated. It will 
thus be possible for importing nations to demonstrate "causation" with some regularity 
using the tests that the panel applies. But if any relationship exists between that set of 
cases, and the set of cases in which safeguard measures are appropriate on some 
principled basis, it will arise only by "coincidence." 
 b. The Nonattribution Problem 
 Following the lead of the Appellate Body, the panel makes clear that the presence 
of a "causal link" between imports and injury, established as above, is not enough to 
satisfy the requirements of the Safeguards Agreement. If other factors have also 
contributed to injury, the "competent authorities must separate and distinguish the 
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injurious effect of the increased imports from the injurious effects of the other factors."91 
This exercise is required even though imports need not be solely responsible for injury, 
but must merely have contributed to it. A proper nonattribution analysis also determines 
the permissible scope of the safeguard remedy—the Appellate Body had ruled in United 
States—Line Pipe that safeguard measures may only remedy the injury attributable to 
increased imports, not that attributable to other factors.92 
 For a number of product lines, the panel found the ITC's nonattribution analysis to 
be lacking. The panel's approach, as in previous cases, was simply to accept at face value 
the "other factors" put forth by the respondents at the ITC, with no discussion as to how 
or why they are appropriate or inappropriate. The panel would then check to see whether 
the ITC had confidently distinguished the injury attributable to the factor in question, and 
ensured that such injury was not attributed to imports. 
 I offer one illustrative example of the analysis: In the case of hot-rolled bar, as 
noted above, the panel accepted the ITC's analysis of the conditions of competition as a 
basis for finding a causal link between increased imports and injury. But the respondents 
argued before the ITC that injury was caused, inter alia, by increased input costs for 
domestic producers, what the panel termed increases in the costs of goods sold (COGS). 
The ITC acknowledged that COGS had risen during part of the period of investigation, 
but argued that import competition had suppressed prices and prevented domestic firms 
from recouping their higher costs. On that basis, the ITC concluded that imports were the 
more important cause of injury. The panel evidently considered this analysis too cursory, 
thus falling short of a "reasoned and adequate" explanation. The panel hinted, however, 
that if the ITC had gone further in its analysis, it might have been able to defend its 
conclusion. In particular, the panel noted that there was a general lack of "coincidence" 
between changes in COGS and operating margins for domestic producers. Had changes 
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in COGS "played a significant role in the situation of the domestic industry, one would 
have expected operating margins to increase while COGS was decreasing."93 
 Analysis. The panel's discussion of the nonattribution requirement suffers from 
the same logical flaws as the treatment of the issue in prior cases. Its analysis of the 
COGS factor for hot-rolled bar illustrates the fundamental problem. An increase in input 
costs for domestic firms will lead them to institute price increases if they can. But, as 
may have been the case in the hot-rolled bar market, import competition may prevent 
such price increases. The price increases that are attempted by domestic firms, caused by 
rising input prices, may thus be the cause of greater import volumes, which restrain price 
increases and leave domestic firms in a weakened financial situation.  
 The panel insists, however, that the injury attributed to rising COGS must be 
distinguished from the injury attributed to imports. As the above discussion makes clear, 
this task is logically impossible. The imports themselves result from increases in COGS, 
and so how can the effects of the two possibly be distinguished? Putting it differently, the 
causal variable in this scenario is an increase in domestic input costs. The result is both 
an increase in imports, and a weakened financial situation for domestic firms. For the 
same reason, the proposition that a permissible safeguard measure can address the injury 
caused by increased imports, but not the injury caused by rising COGS, is also 
fundamentally incoherent. 
 The panel's suggestion that one can analyze the importance of COGS by looking 
at the coincidence between changes in COGS and operating margins is silly. Other things 
being equal, increases in COGS will surely tend to lower operating margins, but many 
other factors in the market are variable over time, and the absence of a "coincidence" 
between changes in COGS and operating margins simply indicates that other things are 
happening simultaneously—a clear demonstration of why "coincidence" and causation 
are two different things. Obviously, the presence of other factors varying simultaneously 
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cannot negate the fact that increases in input costs, other things being equal, are 
disadvantageous for domestic producers. 
 The ultimate issue here is a simple one—should safeguard measures be permitted 
when the cause of injury to a domestic industry, and the cause of rising imports, is a 
shock to the cost structure of domestic firms? There may be good reasons to answer this 
question yes or no, but the analysis of the panel merely masks and confuses it.  
 4. Parallelism 
 The "parallelism" requirement stems from the decision in Argentina—Footwear.  
The Appellate Body there held that a correspondence must exist between the imports 
included in the analysis that led to the injury determination, and the imports covered by 
the safeguard measure.94 Thus, for example, if imports from Canada were part of the data 
on which the injury finding rests, imports from Canada cannot be exempted from any 
subsequent safeguards remedy. 
 The legal basis for the parallelism requirement is shaky. In a recent article in this 
journal, Joost Pauwelyn criticizes it and argues forcefully that the real issue is whether 
Article XXIV of GATT, pertaining to the formation of customs unions and free trade 
areas, either requires or permits members of such entities to exempt imports from other 
members from safeguard measures.95 This question thus far has no clear answer—for a 
thoughtful discussion of the issues I refer the reader to Pauwelyn's article.  
 Whatever its merits, the parallelism requirement is established in the cases, and 
the United States undertook to argue that it had complied. The original ITC determination 
had aggregated imports from all sources, however, while the eventual safeguard measures 
had largely excluded imports from NAFTA countries, Israel and Jordan. The ITC was 
asked to revise its analysis to exclude these imports in its supplemental report to USTR. 
It did so, and reached the same conclusions for each industry.   
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 The panel took issue with the analysis for several reasons. In several instances, 
the ITC had not made clear that it had properly excluded imports from Israel and Jordan 
in its revised analysis. The ITC also failed to explain to the panel's satisfaction why its 
findings remained the same despite the fact that a smaller quantity of imports was 
involved after the parallelism adjustments. In addition, the panel held that the ITC was 
obliged to repeat its nonattribution analysis based on the revised import totals, and that it 
had failed to do so in the supplemental report. 
 Analysis. In the interest of parallelism, the panel would have the ITC revise its 
import data, and then undertake the same conceptually flawed analyses of coincidence, 
conditions of competition, and nonattribution. The excluded imports would become an 
“other factor” to which injury from the included imports could not be attributed. Such 
exercises are no more valuable with the revised data than with the original. 
 It is also somewhat peculiar that neither the panel nor the prior pertinent decisions 
draw any connection between the parallelism issue and the unforeseen developments 
issue. If the United States is obliged by Article XIX to draw a connection between injury 
and developments in Asia and the former Soviet Union, is it not possible that such injury 
was transmitted through an effect on imports from particular sources, rather than an 
effect on all imports or on world prices? Does the answer to that question have any 
implications for the permissible scope of the safeguard remedy, or for the possible 
exclusion of imports from particular sources? 
 Were the parallelism issue to be approached in an economically intelligible 
fashion, either the hypothetical quota approach to injury analysis set out in Section I.C 
above, or the import supply curve approach to injury analysis, could be employed to 
inquire whether developments relating to some subset of import suppliers had caused 
injury. Such an inquiry would further increase the complexity of the economic analysis 
required in these cases, but is at least possible in principle. Until a logically sound 
approach to the question of causation is articulated by the Appellate Body or in a 
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renegotiated Safeguards Agreement, however, the requirement of parallelism is just a 
sideshow. 
C. The Appellate Body Decision 
The Appellate Body affirmed the panel in most pertinent respects, or exercised 
judicial economy to avoid reaching the issues raised.96 With respect to the unforeseen 
developments issue, it concurred with the panel that a member proposing to invoke 
safeguards must demonstrate that unforeseen developments led to increased imports for 
each “industry” covered by a safeguard measure.97 It likewise concurred that the ITC had 
failed to make such a showing with a “reasoned and adequate” explanation.98 
 On the question of increased imports, the Appellate Body concurred with the 
panel’s findings on particular products to the extent that they were challenged by the 
United States, with two exceptions. With regard to tin mill products and stainless steel 
wire, the Appellate Body disagreed with the panel that the findings of different 
Commissioners, who had defined the industries in varying ways, could not individually 
or collectively suffice as a “reasoned and adequate” explanation for a finding of 
increased imports.99 Thus, the panel was reversed for failing to consider the matter 
further, although it was unnecessary for the Appellate Body to complete the panel’s 
analysis because it found the safeguard measures for tin mill products and stainless steel 
wire to be illegal on other grounds.100 
Regarding the parallelism issue, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the 
ITC had not shown that it had properly excluded imports from Canada, Mexico, Israel 
and Jordan in reaching its findings. It emphasized especially that the ITC had not 
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considered the excluded imports as an “other factor” in a proper nonattribution 
analysis.101 
Finally, because its rulings on the unforeseen developments, increased imports 
and parallelism issues sufficed for finding that each of the ten challenged measures 
violated WTO law, the Appellate Body declined to consider the panel’s analysis of the 
causation issue. 
Analysis. Unlike its prior rulings in the Safeguards area, the Appellate Body 
ruling in the steel dispute broke little new ground. To the extent that any important new 
law was made, it consisted of affirming the reasoning of the panel on certain key points 
that have already been discussed extensively above. Nothing in the opinion resolves any 
of the conundrums raised by prior Appellate Body decisions. 
What emerges from the steel dispute is a renewed sense of how difficult it will be 
for WTO members to use safeguards going forward without a prospect of near certain 
defeat when a complaint is brought against them. Members must demonstrate the 
existence of unanticipated developments, persuade that they were “unforeseen,” 
convincingly trace their impact on increased imports, demonstrate that much of the 
import surge is sufficiently “recent,” convincingly show the relation between the imports 
and serious injury, and convincingly show that “other factors” have not caused the injury 
attributed to increased imports (in some cases a logical impossibility for the reasons 
discussed above), all in a way that will stand up to analytic quibbles on review. And let 
us not forget the issues that neither the panel nor the Appellate Body chose to reach—the 
challenges brought by complainants regarding the existence of serious injury and the 
definition of “industry” for purposes of the injury analysis. In the face of all these hurdles 
to the opportunity to employ safeguards, one might hope for some clear guidance as to 
what is required to pass muster on each of them. Instead, the decisions to date—including 
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those in the steel case—simply find that the analysis of national authorities is not 
“reasoned and adequate,” without saying what alternative reasoning will suffice.  
The opinions hint, although do not state explicitly, that nothing short of 
sophisticated economic modeling for every relevant “industry” will be required to 
distinguish the effects of the various factors in play in each case. Yet, even where the 
construction of such models is feasible given cost and data considerations, they cannot by 
themselves address the fundamental task of separating the effect of “imports” from the 
effect of “other factors.” Until law is made as to what economic forces fall into each 
category, even the most sophisticated style of economic analysis cannot go forward—the 
questions to be answered have simply not been posed intelligibly. 
Conclusion 
 In the absence of any coherent standards as to when safeguard measure are 
permissible, it is unrealistic to expect WTO members to produce a “reasoned and 
adequate explanation” as to how their measures are in compliance with the law. It should 
come as no surprise that every measure brought before the WTO has been struck down in 
this environment, and one is at a loss as to how to advise member nations to fix the 
problem. It will also come as no surprise if WTO members eventually throw up their 
hands and revert to extra-legal alternatives. Absent a thorough renegotiation of the 
Safeguards Agreement, perhaps the only way out of the current predicament is for the 
Appellate Body to take the lead in fashioning a sensible common law of safeguards, 
drawing on nontextual ideas about their proper role in the WTO system. In my prior 
writings on the subject, I suggest some possible directions for such nontextual theorizing. 
102 Whether or not those suggestions are persuasive, the steel dispute, like its 
predecessors in the safeguards area, makes clear how further guidance is absolutely 
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essential on a number of issues if WTO-legal safeguard measures are to play any role in 
the world trading system. 
 I close with a return to the normative agnosticism of the introduction. To those 
who see safeguard measures as no more than wasteful protectionism for declining 
industries, many of which (such as the U.S. steel industry) have already been to the well 
quite often, insurmountable legal impediments to safeguards may seem welcome. But the 
systemic consequences of eliminating safeguards as a viable option may be less benign 
than this view suggests. The political pressures to protect troubled industries through 
trade policy will remain regardless of the state of the law, as will their potential to cause 
mischief. 
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